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Abstract— This paper shows the design and implementation of 
a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism for securing 
a hypervisor called BitVisor. BitVisor is a small hypervisor 
that provides security functions like encryption services for I/O 
devices in its hypervisor-layer. BitVisor enforces security 
functions without the help of guest OSs, but it only supports a 
static configuration file for machine set up. Consequently, we 
employ the RBAC system called PERMIS, a proven 
implementation of an RBAC policy decision engine and 
credential validation service, in order to provide dynamic 
configuration control. By using PERMIS, we can write finer 
grained authorization policies and can dynamically update 
them for the security-purpose hypervisor.  
Security-purpose hypervisor; Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC); Authorization policies; Virtual Machine Monitors  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
BitVisor is a security-purpose hypervisor that has been 
developed since 2008 [1][2][3][4][5]. The source code of 
BitVisor is available from http://www.bitvisor.org. BitVisor 
was initially developed by a research and development 
project initiated by National Information Security Center 
(NISC) of Japan and executed by several universities and 
companies. The purpose of the project is to prevent 
information leakages from desktop computers and laptop 
computers in governmental and corporate organizations. 
Many information leakage cases are caused by unauthorized 
use of unencrypted USB thumb drives, theft of laptop 
computers with unencrypted internal storage, etc. Fig.1 
shows the architecture of BitVisor. BitVisor is a small 
hypervisor that is designed to enhance the security of 
computing systems by providing data encryption and 
decryption services for both storage media and network 
connections. BitVisor can enhance the security of a computer 
that uses any OS (e.g. Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, etc.) 
because its security functions work on a hypervisor-layer. 
BitVisor is aimed at preventing information leakage with 
minimal overhead. The basic features of BitVisor are the 
following [5]: 
 
Figure 1. Security architecture of BitVisor. 
 
 Boot up login authentication by passwords or PKI-
based smart cards.  
 Data encryption for HDD, SSD, USB storages, CD-
RW, and other storage media. An encryption key is 
stored in each user’s smart card by the organization’s 
administrator. The smart card is protected by the user’s 
PIN number.  
 BitVisor provides a Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
client function by using its built-in IPsec and IKEv1 
module. Once BitVisor is installed, BitVisor is 
transparent to end users (i.e. VPN connections can be 
achieved without the help of any client application on 
the guest OS.). 
 Providing surveillance points of I/O devices (e.g. 
storage, network, etc.) in the hypervisor layer. 
The BitVisor’s security model assumes that a computer can 
be used by many different users, but only by one user at once 
and that each user is identified to the computer by inserting 
his or her smartcard (or his or her password). The OS is then 
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BitVisor has no “switch user” facility available, only 
shutdown and re-boot. 
II. PROBLEMS OF CURRENT BITVISOR 
BitVisor has a static configuration file. The configuration file 
can specify which VPN gateway the computer has to connect 
to, which HDD or SSD devices have to be encrypted, and 
whether the use of USB thumb drives is permitted or not, etc. 
The problems of the current BitVisor are the follows: (1) the 
configuration file of each computer is not written based on 
the user’s identity or roles, but is the same for all users of the 
machine. Therefore, we cannot use any RBAC policy for its 
configuration. Also, (2) the current configuration file is 
installed once at the set up time of each machine by an 
administrator. Therefore it is difficult to change the 
configuration of each machine after distributing the pre-setup 
machines in the organization. In addition, (3) we can not 
specify detailed conditions in the current syntax of 
BitVisor’s configurations. For example, it cannot specify 
when the user can use the machine or network.   
To solve the above problems, this paper shows the design 
and implementation of an integrated combination of an 
RBAC policy decision engine (PERMIS) and a security-
purpose hypervisor (BitVisor). BitVisor already has its 
X.509 PKI-based authentication function. By introducing 
PERMIS’s X.509 PMI-based RBAC authorization function 
onto BitVisor, administrators will be able to control its 
security functions in a more flexible manner. PERMIS 
policies are fine grained, and can be dynamically updated. 
We show some useful examples of authorization policies that 
can be used for security-purpose hypervisors. This paper’s 
contribution is to show a novel implementation of role-based 
access control mechanism for security-purpose hypervisors. 
III. POLICY DECISION MECHANISMS OF PERMIS 
This section presents a brief overview of PERMIS’s 
authorization mechanisms. There are two types of policy in 
PERMIS [6]. The first policy is for the Credential Validation 
Service (CVS), which controls the user-role assignments. 
The second policy is for the Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
which controls the role-permission assignments. Fig. 2 
shows the relationship between the NIST RBAC model [7] 
and PERMIS. PERMIS also can handle SOD (Separation of 
duty) constraints [8] and role hierarchies. All of these 




Figure 2. Relationship between NIST RBAC model and PERMIS. 
A. Credential Validation Service (CVS) Policies 
Table 1 shows an example policy of the Credential 
Validation Service (CVS) in the new system. This policy 
specifies who can assign which roles to whom, under which 
constraints. BitVisor uses two roles, permisRole and 
securityLevel. The permisRole is used for assigning each 
user’s role. The securityLevel is used for distinguishing the 
security level of each computer. In Table 1, we define the 
same issuer (Source of Authority – SOA) for these two types 
of role. This policy permits operations of user assignments 
for both the users and the computers belonging to the 
specified subject domain, O=TNCT, L=Toyota, ST=Aichi, 
C=JP by the SOA who has the subject distinguished name 
(DN) of CN=SOA, O=TNCT, L=Toyota, ST=Aichi, C=JP. 
If we were to have different SOAs for users and computers, 
then we would use different issuers for each role type. Fig. 3 
shows an actual CVS policy in the system. We defined three 
roles for users: permisRoles of Manager, Employee, and 
Trainee. We also defined five (integer) roles for computers: 
securityLevel of 1 through to 5, where 1 is the lowest 
security level and 5 is the highest. Alternatively we could 
have defined role hierarchy policies in the PERMIS’s policy 
syntax for string values e.g. securityLevel 2 is superior to 
securityLevel 1 etc. 
 












































<SOA ID="TheSOA" /> 
<SubjectDomain ID="SubjectDomain" /> 
<RoleList> 
<Role Type="permisRole" Value="Manager" /> 
<Role Type="permisRole" Value="Employee" /> 
<Role Type="permisRole" Value="Trainee" /> 
<Role Type="securityLevel" Value="1" /> 
<Role Type="securityLevel" Value="2" /> 
<Role Type="securityLevel" Value="3" /> 
<Role Type="securityLevel" Value="4" /> 
<Role Type="securityLevel" Value="5" /> 
</RoleList> 
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<Action ID="diskIO" Name="DiskIO"> 
<Argument Name="encryption" Type="Boolean" /> 






<Target><TargetDomain ID="USBdevicesTargetDomain" /> 
<AllowedAction ID="diskIO" /></Target> 
</TargetList> 




<GE><Environment Parameter="securityLevel" Type="Integer" /> 
<Constant Value="1" Type="Integer" /></GE> 
<LE><Environment Parameter="securityLevel" Type="Integer"/> 
<Constant Value="4" Type="Integer" /></LE> 
</AND> 
<EQ><Arg Name="encryption" Type="Boolean" /> 






<Target><TargetDomain ID="USBdevicesTargetDomain" /> 
   <AllowedAction ID="diskIO" /></Target> 
</TargetList> 
<RoleList><Role Type="permisRole" Value="Manager" /></RoleList> 
<IF> 
<AND> 
<EQ><Environment Parameter="securityLevel" Type="Integer" /> 
<Constant Value="5" Type="Integer" /></EQ> 
<EQ><Arg Name="encryption" Type="Boolean" /> 






Figure 4. A part of a permission assignment policy for the system. 
 
B. PDP Policies 
Fig. 4 shows a part of a role permission assignment policy 
in the new system. TargetPolicy defines a name and DN of 
a target resource for access control decisions. This example 
says the target resource is USB devices. Next, ActionPolicy 
defines the actions that have to be controlled. This example 
defines the USB devices’ action named “DiskIO” with a 
Boolean parameter that specifies encryption or not. Finally, 
TargetAccessPolicy defines the permitted actions on targets 
for roles, along with any conditions. The first TargetAccess 
permits an Employee to perform IO operations on a USB 
devices’ disk with the following condition: (1) The 
computer’s securityLevel is between 1 and 4; and (2) the 
disk IO operations are executed with encryption. The next 
TargetAccess permits a Manager to perform IO operations 
on a USB devices’ disk with the following conditions: (1) 
the computer’s securityLevel is 5 and (2) the disk IO 
operations are executed with encryption. Any action that is 
not defined in this policy is automatically denied. For 
example, another role Trainee cannot use any USB devices 
even if he or she uses the encryption functions. 
C. Role Management and Policy Elements  for Security-
purpose Hypervisors 
This subsection describes the role management method for 
security-purpose hypervisors. We also describe the building 
blocks of PERMIS’s policies. PERMIS’s policies are 
basically constructed by elements of Issuers, Subjects, 
Actions, Targets, and Environments. We describe the 
relationship between these elements and the security-purpose 
hypervisor, BitVisor, as follows: 
 Issuers are Sources of Authority (SOAs) that issue 
attributes (roles) to subjects, as digitally signed X.509 
attribute certificates (ACs) [9]. 
 Subjects are the users using particular computers. A 
user’s name (i.e. Subject DN) is retrieved from the 
user’s X.509 public key certificate (PKC) which is 
stored on his or her smartcard when the administrator 
sets up the smart card before distributing it. In the new 
system, a user’s roles are dynamically retrieved as 
X.509 attribute certificates (ACs) from LDAP servers 
after executing BitVisor’s authentication function. By 
introducing this method, administrators can change a 
user’s roles dynamically even if the smart card is 
already setup and distributed to the user.  
 The computers are used by the users, but they are also 
Subjects in terms of role assignments. The computer’s 
identifier (i.e. Subject DN) is stored in the computer’s 
X.509 PKC by an administrator at setup time. Like 
users’ roles, the computer’s role is retrieved as an 
X.509 AC from an LDAP server. As a result, 
administrators can change a computer’s role 
dynamically even if the computer is already setup and 
distributed to users. A computer’s role expresses the 
computer’s security level. 
 Actions state what the user wants to do on the Targets. 
In BitVisor, Actions basically state input and output 
operations and optionally attachment operations of 
external devices. The input and output operations for 
storage devices and for NIC devices can take arguments 
for options such as encryption. 
 Targets are the types of resource. In BitVisor, they are 
I/O devices including storage devices, NIC devices, etc. 
BitVisor supports the following I/O devices: storage 
devices (ATA, AHCI and AHCI_ATAPI), external 
optical discs (ATAPI), USB devices (USB), and 
network devices (NIC).  
 In PERMIS’s policy, Environment states (conditions 
on) environment variables like the current time and date, 
or the GPS location. In the prototype system, the 
Environment is used to state the required security level 




Figure 5. The relationship between user’s subject DN, user’s roles, computer’s subject DN, computer’s roles (i.e. security level), and policies in BitVisor. 
 
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between user’s subject DN, 
user’s roles, computer’s subject DN, computer’s roles, and 
authorization policies in the integrated system of PERMIS 
and BitVisor. The red parts show the data and functions for 
PERMIS. The purple box is newly developed for the system. 
The blue parts show the data and functions that were already 
developed in the current BitVisor. 
PERMIS’s authorization polies are encapsulated in the 
form of ACs, and are retrieved from an LDAP server. 
Therefore, administrators can change the authorization 
policy after the setup of users’ smart cards and computers. In 
Fig. 5, the system has three X.509 PKCs of the different 
SOAs, for verifying their issued X.509 ACs. However, we 
can use a single common X.509 PKC of a single SOA if it is 
issues all of the different ACs. Also, the system has the 
computer’s X.509 PKC and private key, and the root CAs’ 
self-signed PKC. It is important to protect the latter two in 
BitVisor. We can protect the root X.509 PKCs, computer’s 
private key, BitVisor, and the system’s software by using 
trusted boot technology [3]. 
IV. STATIC CONFIGURATION FILE FOR BITVISOR 
As described in section II, this paper’s purpose is to enhance 
the BitVisor management method with a secure RBAC 
policy mechanism. Before describing the design of the new 
system, we have to describe the current management 
method of BitVisor with its static configuration file. This 
section shows an example of the static configuration of 
BitVisor.  Fig. 6 shows a definition part for encryption 
operations of USB devices in the current BitVisor’s 
configuration file.  
 
 
1   vmm.driver.concealEHCI=1 
2   vmm.driver.usb.uhci=1 
3   vmm.driver.usb.ehci=1 
4   storage.encryptionKey0.place=IC 
5   storage.conf1.type=USB 
6   storage.conf1.host_id=-1 
7   storage.conf1.device_id=-1 
8   storage.conf1.lba_low=0 
9   storage.conf1.lba_high=0x9FFFFFFF 
10   storage.conf1.keyindex=0 
11   storage.conf1.crypto_name=aes-xts 
12   storage.conf1.keybits=256 
 
Figure 6. A definition part for encryption operations in BitVisor’s 
configuration file 
 
Lines 1 to 3 state that the encryption function is enabled. 
Line 4 states that the encryption key is stored in a user’s 
smartcard. Lines 5 to 12 state how to encrypt USB devices. 
In the current BitVisor architecture, an administrator installs 
this configuration file onto a computer at the first setup time. 
Therefore, an administrator cannot change this configuration 
after the initial setup of the computer. BitVisor’s 
configuration file also has definition lines for the VPN 
function of BitVisor, which contains the VPN gateway’s IP 
address, VPN gateway’s authentication method, etc. This 
paper only describes an example policy for storage 
encryption. However, the new system can apply equally 
well for VPN services and the other services of BitVisor 
such as HDD, SSD, CD-RW etc. A detailed specification of 
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Figure 7.  The design of the secure RBAC system for BitVisor. 
 
V. DESIGN 
BitVisor has a preparation step before launching the target 
OS that is to be protected. At the boot time, BitVisor 
launches a special guest OS (a custom initial RAM disk of 
Linux) to process the user authentication function based on 
the PKI-based smart card. If the authentication is successful, 
then BitVisor shuts downs the first operating system 
automatically and launches the target OS to be protected, 
based on its static configuration file. Fig. 7 shows the design 
of the new system. The red boxes show the RBAC extension 
parts. It works in the following way (the steps marked (New) 
indicate the new developments of the system): 
(1) The ID management function authenticates a user using 
his or her smartcard. The smartcard has the user’s 
private key and his or her X.509 PKC. The user’s X.509 
PKC is verified by using the X.509 PKC of the trusted 
root CA(s) that was (were) securely stored in the 
computer at the setup time. 
(2) (New) BitVisor-PERMIS controller constructs a 
PERMIS authorization system passing it the DN of the 
policy SOA and details of the LDAP server to use. 
PERMIS retrieves the authorization policy AC from the 
LDAP server, and asks the authentication service to 
validate that it is signed by the trusted policy SOA. 
(3) (New) BitVisor-PERMIS controller calls the PERMIS 
CVS twice, once to verify the user’s roles, and once to 
verify the computer’s roles. PERMIS retrieves the 
user’s X.509 role ACs from the configured LDAP 
servers based on his or her DN which BitVisor retrieved 
from the user’s X.509 PKC in step (1). PERMIS also 
retrieves the computer’s X.509 role ACs from the 
LDAP servers by using the computer’s DN that 
BitVisor retrieved from the computer’s X.509 PKC. 
(The computer’s X.509 PKC and private key are stored 
securely within the initial RAM disk image that can be 
verified by TPM and by using the X.509 PKC of the 
trusted root CA(s).) PERMIS checks that each role AC 
is signed by the correct SOA, as detailed in the CVS 
policy (see Fig.3), by calling the signature verification 
service. This uses the SOAs’ X.509 PKCs which are 
included within the initial RAM disk image. 
(4) (New) BitVisor-PERMIS controller places the validated 
user’s roles into the subject field, and the computer’s 
roles into the environment field and calls the PERMIS’s 
PDP multiple times. This is to execute a series of tests 
that are used to generate the appropriate configuration 
file for BitVisor with the guest OS, based on the current 
authorization policy.  
(5) (New) The configuration generator dynamically 
generates a bespoke configuration file for BitVisor as 
described below.  
(6) After shutdown of the first guest OS (the initial RAM 
disk of Linux), BitVisor launches the target guest OS to 
be protected. This two-step execution mechanism is 
already used by the current release of BitVisor [3].  
(7) BitVisor enforces the security functions based on the 
configuration file that was generated by the previous 
steps. 
As described above, this paper shows an enhanced method 
of using a secure RBAC function for BitVisor with minimal 
changes to the original system. The main contribution of 
this paper is the translation mechanism from the results of 
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configuration file for BitVisor based on the user’s role, the 
computer’s role, and the authorization policy. The BitVisor-
PERMIS controller program is executed on the initial RAM 
disk of Linux, not on BitVisor, because of the following 
reasons: (1) PERMIS needs a Java VM but BitVisor cannot 
execute a Java VM (this is because BitVisor is written in C 
and assembler), (2) BitVisor has only a limited number of 
targets and actions, therefore it is reasonable to generate a 
static configuration file in advance (the characteristics of the 
BitVisor environments only require a simple solution), and 
(3) it is difficult to provide high performance from XML 
policy parsing (insufficient for BitVisor’s requirements). 
 Fig. 8 shows the architecture of the configuration 
generator. In the system, an administrator has to prepare test 
patterns including targets (e.g. USB devices) and actions 
(e.g. Input and output operations) with encryption options 
(e.g. true or false). For each test pattern, the administrator 
prepares a piece of configuration file that corresponds to the 
result of the test. The system checks all test patterns with the 
retrieved roles by executing the PERMIS PDP engine. Then 
the system selects the appropriate piece of configuration file 
based on the result of the PERMIS PDP engine. Finally, the 
constructed configuration file is used by BitVisor. Fig. 9 
gives an example test and piece of configuration file. In this 
example the test is checking if the user has a role of 
manager and if so, then he can write encrypted files to USB 
devices. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
We implemented the system by using BitVisor 1.3 [5] and 
the latest version of PERMIS decision engine（5.0.2） [10]. 
We used the PERMIS’s policy editor 5.2.6 for generating the 
X.509 authorization policy ACs. We also used the 
PERMIS’s attribute certificate manager 5.0.1 for generating 
X.509 ACs for users’ roles and computers’ roles. We 
employed OpenLDAP 2.2.29 to store the ACs. We used two 
different computers, one for the LDAP server and one that is 
protected by BitVisor. We used Linux kernel 2.6.31.6 for 
making the initial RAM disk image described in section V. 
We tested Ubuntu 12.04LTS as the target guest OS. Table 2 
shows the hardware specification used in the prototype 
implementation. We prepared three smartcards with roles of 
Manager, Employee, and Trainee by using the ID 
management programs of BitVisor. We evaluated the 
prototype system by using the authorization policies shown 
in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. For example, a user with the role 
Employee could not use unencrypted USB devices on 
computers that have securityLevel between 1 and 4. A user 
with the role Manager could use encrypted USB devices on 
a computer that has the highest securityLevel 5. 
VII. DISCUSSION 
The new system does not implement RBAC policies directly 
onto hypervisors. Instead, we implement RBAC in the 
custom initial RAM disk image for BitVisor. The initial  
 
Figure 8. Architecture of the configuration generator program for BitVisor. 
 
Table 2. Hardware specification. 
 
Smart card reader SCM SCR3310 
Smart card NTT Communications 
eLWISE (JICSAP 2.0) 
Host hardware ThinkPad X121e 
USB thumb drive BUFFALO RUF3-C 32GB 
 
Figure 9. An example test and piece of configuration file. 
 
RAM disk image includes the X.509 PKC of the trusted root 
CA and the SOA’s PKCs. The initial RAM disk image of 
Linux is launched first and is protected by BitVisor. In 
addition, we can check the integrity of the initial RAM disk 
image before launching it by using a TPM [3]. We can use 
trusted boot mechanisms for this purpose.  
If we implemented access control mechanisms onto 
hypervisors, we have to implement more faster and efficient 
programs than current PDP engines. For example, Linux’s 
Flask architecture [19] (i.e. SELinux) employs an efficient 
access control method for Linux kernel by translating 
security policies into a special bitmap called access vector 
and uses this bitmap with cache mechanisms. 
Finally, even if we deploy security systems based on 
hypervisors shown in this paper, we have to prevent many 
types of attacks [16][17] against hypervisors in operation. 
VIII. RELATED WORK 
We developed the ID management framework for BitVisor 
in [4]. Our previous work was to enhance BitVisor by using 
user’s identities, but not roles. This paper shows the novel 
design and implementation of RBAC functions for BitVisor. 
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# Action parameters for encryption 
# test number, type of variable, value 
ACT_PARAM=0, Boolean, true 
ACT_PARAM=1, Boolean, false 
An example test 













“0.-1.config” (For error) 
“0.0.config” 
E.g. If the result of PERMIS PDP for 
ACT_PARAM=1 is “permit” then the 
system selects the file “0.1.config”. 
An example of pieces of configuration 
for the test file “0.test”. 
BitVisor technology. HyperSafe is one of BitVisor’s 
applications [11]. HyperSafe provides self-protection and an 
integrity guarantee mechanisms. TreVisor is a hypervisor-
based full disk encryption system that provides resistant 
characteristics to main memory attacks [12]. Oyama et al. 
show a malware detection mechanism by using signatures in 
BitVisor [13].  
XACML [18] is a standard XML policy for access 
control, but XACML does not support credentials and does 
not have a credential validation capability. PERMIS on the 
other hand was originally developed for constructing highly 
secure RBAC systems with digitally signed credentials and 
policies. The current version of BitVisor has the X.509 PKI-
based authentication function; therefore we employ PERMIS 
to provide PMI facilities from the same standard using X.509 
ACs. Now PERMIS has many applications like a privacy 
preserving authorization system for the Cloud [14], self-
adaptive authorization framework for federated access 
environments [15], etc. 
OpenStack [20] is open source IaaS Cloud computing 
software. OpenStack uses a hypervisor for building an IaaS 
Cloud, but not for securing client computers. OpenStack has 
an integrated authentication and RBAC authorization service 
called Keystone, which manages user identities and assigns 
them roles for accessing compute, storage and networking 
resources.  
A recent development for securing client computers is the 
use of Cloud Terminal [21]. Users only use a thin cloud 
terminal program for securing network connections between 
client computers and Cloud servers, for transferring input 
and output data, etc. Since BitVisor protects a running OS in 
a local computer, then we might be able to deploy our 
system for protecting such a thin cloud terminal application 
that is executed on an untrusted local computer. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The system described in this paper can support flexible 
changes of configurations for the security-purpose 
hypervisor, BitVisor. By introducing PERMIS’s RBAC 
facilities, we can write authorization policies, users’ roles 
and computers’ roles and strongly protect them as digitally 
signed X.509 ACs, thus preventing any unauthorized person 
from modifying the configuration. This can be used to 
strongly control the behavior of the distributed computing 
systems in organizations. This paper shows the design and 
implementation of an integrated system with PERMIS’s 
RBAC engine and BitVisor. 
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